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A nuclear security conceptual projection assessment of the limitations improvised for adversary pathways at 
nuclear facilities has been researched on and discussed. A hypothetical facility, DaPaRay, has been chosen for this 
research. Various elements of risk assessment and a description of various adversary groups, whose main aim is often 
theft or sabotage or both, has been used to guide the definition of the scope of this research. In quantifying the risk, 
elements such as vulnerability, threat and consequence or impact of events were assessed for consideration. The 
adversary groups which consists of scenarios of external and internal (i.e. insider threat) capabilities, have been 
considered. A Security Risk Assessment Tool (SRAT) has been employed for this research. SRAT classifies the 
criticality of this research as important and the crisis response capacity as excellent, placing the threshold at a level 12. 
An Assessment of a Projected Adversary Ultimate Limitation (PAUL) of the inherent risk and residual risk showed 
that about 50% of adversary issues considered had an unrealistic and doubtful probability, an unlikely or very unlikely 
descriptor mode of occurrence, with minor or no serious injuries to staff, and with a minimal loss or damage to facility 
assets, and little or minimum delay, in the next 2 to 5 years of the facility’s routine operation. About 30% of adversary 
issues had a high or expected probability of occurring with a very likely or likely descriptor mode of occurrence with 
an impact of severe injuries or even death of staff, major or complete destruction of facility assets leading to a severe 
disruption or closure of the facility, which could occur any day or within any week. About 20% of the adversary issues 
considered had a reasonable probability of occurring with a moderately likely descriptor mode of occurrence, which 
had an impact but of non-life-threatening injury to staff members, with a loss or damage to some assets, causing some 
delays and disruptions once a year or once a month. The percentages obtained are to be used in forming a markov 
chain which comprises of a combination of probabilities and matrix operations. A long run distribution vector is 
expected to be generated from the transition matrix that will be formed from the transition diagram of the probability 
tree. The resultant distribution vector will aid nuclear security researchers in projections related to adversary activities 
and their limitations. The projected adversarial activities are therefore expected to be met with the respective facility 
specific designed response.  
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